A threshold system completes a public task only after verifiable shares are publicly committed. If the honest schedule creates share opportunities by deadline , then shares are slack such that a coalition delays completion if and only if it withholds at least shares. The incentive problem is therefore to price the cheapest sabotage set. Agents receive a direct fee per committed share. A delaying coalition may also obtain delay value at most , and may earn additional fee revenue during recovery after the deadline. Let be a pathwise upper bound on the coalition’s incremental fee revenue in a recovery slot that completes the task, including any same-slot overshoot. The principal can post a nonnegative completion bounty that depends only on committed shares, uses no deposits or punishments, and expires if completion is late. The optimal rule is uniform, as if completion occurs by , every admissible horizon share receives , otherwise no bounty is paid. Full participation is ex-post strongly delay proof exactly when Equivalently, the exact worst-case budget is The bound is tight for every nonnegative completion measurable bounty, among the horizon shares, some receive total bounty at most , and withholding precisely those shares delays completion. The result applies to threshold signatures, data availability certification, coded dissemination, and generic -of- completion tasks. We also isolate a separate limit, no transfer rule based only on completed shares can remove a final slot race in which a coalition has already observed enough pre-completion shares to act.

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