Resolution of Simpson's paradox via the common cause principle

Simpson’s paradox is an obstacle to establishing a probabilistic association between two events $a_1$ and $a_2$, given the third (lurking) random variable $B$. We focus on scenarios when the random variables $A$ (which combines $a_1$, $a_2$, and their complements) and $B$ have a common cause $C$ that need not be observed. Alternatively, we can assume that $C$ screens out $A$ from $B$. For such cases, the correct association between $a_1$ and $a_2$ is to be defined via conditioning over $C$. This setup generalizes the original Simpson’s paradox: now its two contradicting options refer to two particular and different causes $C$. We show that if $B$ and $C$ are binary and $A$ is quaternary (the minimal and the most widespread situation for the Simpson’s paradox), the conditioning over any binary common cause $C$ establishes the same direction of association between $a_1$ and $a_2$ as the conditioning over $B$ in the original formulation of the paradox. Thus, for the minimal common cause, one should choose the option of Simpson’s paradox that assumes conditioning over $B$ and not its marginalization. The same conclusion is reached when Simpson’s paradox is formulated via 3 continuous Gaussian variables: within the minimal formulation of the paradox (3 scalar continuous variables $A_1$, $A_2$, and $B$), one should choose the option with the conditioning over $B$.