Safety alignment is often conceptualized as a monolithic process wherein harmfulness detection automatically triggers refusal. However, the persistence of jailbreak attacks suggests a fundamental mechanistic decoupling. We propose the isentangled afety ypothesis , positing that safety computation operates on two distinct subspaces: a (, Knowing'') and an \textit{Execution Axis} ($\mathbf{v}_R$, Acting’‘). Our geometric analysis reveals a universal Reflex-to-Dissociation'' evolution, where these signals transition from antagonistic entanglement in early layers to structural independence in deep layers. To validate this, we introduce \textit{Double-Difference Extraction} and \textit{Adaptive Causal Steering}. Using our curated \textsc{AmbiguityBench}, we demonstrate a causal double dissociation, effectively creating a state of Knowing without Acting.’’ Crucially, we leverage this disentanglement to propose the , which achieves State-of-the-Art attack success rates by surgically lobotomizing the refusal mechanism. Furthermore, we uncover a critical architectural divergence, contrasting the of Llama3.1 with the of Qwen2.5. The code and dataset are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DSH.

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