A Schelling model with switching agents: decreasing segregation via random allocation and social mobility

We study the behaviour of a Schelling-class system in which a fraction $f$ of spatially-fixed switching agents is introduced. This new model allows for multiple interpretations, including: (i) random, non-preferential allocation ($\mathit{\text{e.g.}}$ by housing associations) of given, fixed sites in an open residential system, and (ii) superimposition of social and spatial mobility in a closed residential system.\ We find that the presence of switching agents in a segregative Schelling-type dynamics can lead to the emergence of intermediate patterns ($\mathit{\text{e.g.}}$ mixture of patches, fuzzy interfaces) as the ones described in Ref. 1. We also investigate different transitions between segregated and mixed phases both at $f=0$ and along lines of increasing $f$, where the nature of the transition changes.