How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach

We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger normative constraints on acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game. This framework yields two outcomes – cyclic authoritarian resurgence through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist–authoritarian coalition excluding resistance – depending on confrontation responses. We demonstrate how an established dynamical framework with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions clarifies conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance.