We provide deterministic, polynomial-time computable voting rules that
approximate Dodgson’s and (the minimization version'' of) Young's scoring rules to within a logarithmic factor. Our approximation of Dodgson's rule is tight up to a constant factor, as Dodgson's rule is $\NP$-hard to approximate to within some logarithmic factor. The maximization version’’ of Young’s rule
is known to be -hard to approximate by any constant factor. Both
approximations are simple, and natural as rules in their own right: Given a
candidate we wish to score, we can regard either its Dodgson or Young score as
the edit distance between a given set of voter preferences and one in which the
candidate to be scored is the Condorcet winner. (The difference between the two
scoring rules is the type of edits allowed.) We regard the marginal cost of a
sequence of edits to be the number of edits divided by the number of reductions
(in the candidate’s deficit against any of its opponents in the pairwise race
against that opponent) that the edits yield. Over a series of rounds, our
scoring rules greedily choose a sequence of edits that modify exactly one
voter’s preferences and whose marginal cost is no greater than any other such
single-vote-modifying sequence.

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