Strategic Voting Axioms for Multiwinner Elections

We create a set of 6 axioms relating to strategic voting and study them on single transferable vote (STV), Meek STV, Bloc, Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda. For Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda, we implement optimistic'' and pessimistic’’ models for handing incomplete ballots, thus turning each of the three into two separate voting rules. We determine which voting rules satisfy each axiom. We find that under Chamberlin-Courant and k-Borda, the optimistic models encourage burying, while the pessimistic models encourage truncation strategies, indicating that the handling of partial ballots has tremendous implications for strategic voting. We define an axiom called no skipped payment that differentiates similar rules, as Meek STV and Chamberlin-Courant satisfy it, while STV and Monroe fail. Each voting rule was found to fail favorite betrayal, revealing that none of them are completely immune to strategic voting. In general, STV variants are relatively resistant to strategic voting while Monroe is susceptible to a wide range of strategies.